I am a Research Professor at Tecnologico de Monterrey’s Graduate School of Government and Public Transformation, and Fellow at the BBVA-TEC Center for Trade Policy and Global Value Chains in North America. My fields of research are Political Economy and Development Economics. My work leverages advanced quantitative methods to study the political causes and consequences of some of today’s most pressing development issues - inequality, violence, trade, migration and growth. I have a PhD in Public Policy (Economics Track) from Harvard University, and pursued postdoctoral research at Princeton Politics and Harvard’s Growth Lab. Previously, I was an Assistant Professor in Texas A&M’s Bush School of Government and Public Service.
You can download my CV here.
PhD in Public Policy, 2022
Harvard University
Masters in Public Administration in International Development, 2012
Harvard University
Bachelor of Arts in Economics, 2009
Universidad Católica Andrés Bello
Abstract: This Element critically examines the claim that United States economic sanctions on Venezuela constituted ‘collective punishment’ of the Venezuelan population, contributing significantly to the country’s economic collapse and humanitarian crisis. Through comprehensive analysis of economic, developmental, and welfare indicators from 2013 to 2023, it demonstrates that the bulk of Venezuela’s economic devastation - including 52 percent of GDP losses and 98 percent of import declines - largely occurred before financial sanctions were imposed in August 2017. Key welfare indicators such as infant mortality, undernourishment, and life expectancy had deteriorated substantially by 2017 and subsequently stabilized or improved following sanctions implementation, contradicting narratives that attribute Venezuela’s collapse primarily to external economic pressure. The Element provides a timeline of Venezuelan economic and political events around sanctions and a critical review of the literature on their economic effects. (Caracas Chronicles Interview) | (VPI TV Interview) | (Runrunes/TalCual/ElPitazo Interview (Min 13:30)) | (Response note to comments: English + Spanish)
Abstract: We study the impact of government-sponsored participatory institutions (PIs) in non-democratic settings. We propose an original theoretical framework to investigate how changing incumbent priorities shape PIs’ developmental and political effects. While captured PIs can multitask to deliver both developmental gains and political rewards, radical patrons can force PIs to specialize only in political activities. We deploy our framework to study Venezuela’s Communal Councils. Leveraging difference-in-differences analyses, an original survey of Council participants, and 51 interviews with government officials and grassroots Communal Council members, we find that the Councils yielded both economic and political benefits during an early period marked by political stability and regime consolidation. However, as Venezuela’s economic collapse pushed the country’s increasingly survival-oriented government toward authoritarianism, the Councils became politically specialized, serving primarily as tools of autocratic control. Our findings question the viability of captured PIs for advancing developmental goals in autocratic settings, while demonstrating their effectiveness in consolidating authoritarian control. (Preprint)
Abstract: Maduro’s capture in January 2026 makes Venezuela’s transitional-justice problem urgent: how to secure elite acquiescence without sacrificing truth, accountability, reparation, and non-repetition. Trump’s choice to work with interim leader Delcy Rodríguez over opposition winner María Corina Machado highlights an adverse-selection dilemma—regime insiders may fear Machado is a maximalist who will punish anyone tied to Chavismo. Yet a rushed, blanket amnesty would validate repression and shield perpetrators. Drawing on the cases of Spain, Chile, Argentina, South Africa, Egypt, and Iraq, this essay proposes a differentiated amnesty that sorts actors by crime severity and strategic importance, along four pathways: exile, exceptions, truth, and prosecution. (Review of Democracy Interview)
Abstract: Do refugees settle in destinations that are ecologically similar to their origins? We assess the relevance of “climate matching” theories of migration for Venezuelan refugees in South America. Leveraging social media data, we build and validate the first local bilateral matrix of Venezuelan flows across the region. We measure bilateral ecological similarities in terms of temperature, precipitation, elevation, and distance to the coastline. Performing Poisson Pseudo-Maximum Likelihood gravity models of migration, we show that Venezuelan flows are more likely between ecologically similar areas. Model predictions explain independent measurements of Venezuelans’ settlement choices at both bilateral and destination levels. (Preprint) (Blog EGTP) (The Policy Lab Podcast)
Abstract: The purpose of the Glocal dataset is to enable development research that requires both international scope and subnational precision. Leveraging modern geospatial analysis tools, we process a diverse array of sources to provide researchers with a growing set of economic, demographic, ecological and socio-political variables at comparable geographic and temporal units. We provide separate files for data at the first (Country), second (i.e. State) and third administrative (i.e. Municipality) levels with either static, yearly or monthly periodicity. We also provide a number of ad-hoc files for specific topics. Given the growing number of public, granular and relevant sources, we hope to continue expanding this dataset in the future. (Dataset Repository) (Visualization Tool)
Abstract: Aiming to stimulate local electoral support, presidential candidates often devote their scarce time to visiting local communities. Comparing visited and non-visited communities to assess the effect of visits is likely to yield biased results, as other campaign interventions tend to correlate with visits. This paper studies the local electoral effects of Henrique Capriles Radonsky (HCR)’s visits in 2012 on his presidential bids against Hugo Chávez in 2012 and Nicolás Maduro in 2013. Leveraging the panel structure of electoral outcomes and unique data on local priorities for the deployment of campaign efforts, I estimate that HCR visits improved his electoral support by 0.5 percentage points without affecting electoral turnout. These effects concentrate for the 2013 election, and are contingent to low-priority environments, suggesting that visits operate as substitutes of other campaign interventions. Overall, results suggest that visits affected electoral outcomes by locally enhancing access to information about HCR. (Preprint)
Abstract: This paper investigates the effect of priming the existence of corrupt connections to the bureaucracy on the demand for intermediary services. We perform an experimental survey with undergraduate students in Caracas, Venezuela. Participants are presented with a hypothetical situation in which they need to obtain the apostille of their professional degrees in order to migrate, and are considering whether to hire an intermediary (“gestor”) or not. The survey randomly reveals the existence of an illicit connection between the gestor and the bureaucracy. Our findings are not consistent with a “market maker” hypothesis that revealing the existence of illicit connections increases demand. Consistent with the view that trust is a key element in inherently opaque transactions, we find that the demand for intermediaries is price inelastic when gestores are referred by trusted individuals.
Abstract: This paper finds that law enforcement interventions during the Mexican Drug War (MDW) hindered local export growth. We leverage exogenous variation in drug enforcement from the close election of mayors affliated with the national ruling party during the MDW. Firms servicing the same markets but exogenously exposed to drug enforcement experienced lower export growth. The MDW decreased capital investments, eroding productivity gains in capital-intensive activities. (Preprint) (Online appendix) (Faculti Interview)
Abstract: Do gains from globalization erode support for economic nationalism? We implement a shift-share strategy to study how NAFTA-enhanced local access to US-markets affected Mexican demands for protectionist platforms. The left, led by Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO), under-performed in cities benefiting from export access gains during the 2006 presidential elections. This effect is observed strictly in 2006, the only post-NAFTA election in which debates over trade integration played a salient role. Our findings are robust to controls for import competing pressures from NAFTA and the China Shock. AMLO’s 2006 protectionist platform likely cost him that year’s election, and campaign media strategies in 2012 map to this earlier backlash. (Preprint)
Abstract: In areas where opponents of a clientelistic incumbent lead poverty-alleviation efforts, fear of retaliation may intensify clientelistic compliance. We analyze the opposition affiliated Alimenta la Solidaridad soup kitchens in Caracas amid Venezuela’s humanitarian and political crises. Voter turnout persisted near these kitchens during elections boycotted by the opposition. Consistent with a model linking fear of retaliation, vulnerability, and clientelism, we observe that this backfire was strongest in impoverished areas and limited in regime-supportive ones. Results are contingent on communities previously subjected to electoral intimidation and violence by regime supporters, and cannot be explained by distributive responses from the regime.
Abstract: We leverage geographic discontinuities in international air travel costs to show that regular direct connections between countries enable them to trade, especially in specialized products. Back-of-the-envelope calculations suggest that the effect of direct flights at this margin could account for up to 1.6% of world trade. While direct flights do not affect the shipping cost of goods, they do enable bilateral business travel. Countries with stronger direct air connections tend to specialize away from each other’s baseline comparative advantages. These findings suggest that the possibility of conducting business in person remains critical for bilateral trade and influences countries’ patterns of specialization.
Abstract: Why are some economies persistently poorer than others? This report argues that a critical and underappreciated part of the answer lies in remoteness—the distance that separates an economy from the inputs, expertise, and markets it needs to prosper. Integrating insights from economic gravity models and economic complexity theory, we develop a framework in which remoteness constrains development primarily by limiting access to the diverse inputs and capabilities required for complex production—the key engine of modern economic growth. We show that at 80 percent of the negative relationship between remoteness and income per capita is mediated through lower economic complexity, rather than through other direct channels like market-access constraints. Building on these and additional findings, we propose a dual policy framework for remote economies. Remoteness-circumventing strategies identify industries that are feasible in a given remote economy because they are inherently resilient to distance or because the necessary inputs and capabilities are available in the country’s vicinity. Remoteness-reducing strategies aim to lower effective distance through connectivity infrastructure, trade policy reform, the development of remote-work ecosystems, and productive engagement of the diaspora. Together, these complementary approaches can help remote economies chart viable paths toward diversification and sustained prosperity.
Abstract: This paper introduces a theory of autocratic redistribution and repression during economic downturns. It predicts that negative shocks induce autocrats to favor supporters in order to limit the scope of protests to opposition groups. I provide evidence on economic outcomes and policy responses to shocks from three different settings. Firstly, I focus on the Venezuelan blackouts of 2019. Nicolás Maduro’s autocratic regime protected supporter regions affected by power losses through selective rationing, containing economic consequences, protests and repression to affected opposition areas. In contrast, Hugo Chávez’s still democratic government responded to the 1999 Vargas floods with reconstruction efforts that did not engage in political discrimination, leading to balanced economic consequences across the state. Finally, I show that national droughts in Sub-Saharan Africa magnify economic differences favoring leaders’ home regions, but only under autocracies rule. These findings show how regime type can shapen the response to economic shocks. (VoxDev Column) (Blog EGTP)
Abstract: We examine how geographic proximity substitutes for contract-enforcement institutions in enabling trade in specialized goods. When products require customization, successful trade depends on either strong contract enforcement or close buyer-seller relationships enabling monitoring and trust. Proximity facilitates such relationships by reducing business travel costs. Our theoretical framework predicts institutional quality primarily affects specialized trade at longer distances, where relationship-building becomes prohibitively expensive. Using bilateral product-specific export data in a gravity model, we find strong empirical support for this prediction. Consistent with our theory, business travel and passenger flights decline more sharply with distance toward destinations with weak contract enforcement institutions.
Abstract: Do leaders court or cut the entourage of sidelined elites during economic crises? We look at the case of Rafael Ramirez, Venezuela’s former Oil Czar, who was purged from Chavismo’s Cabinet in late 2014. We find that Ramirez-affiliated individuals and firms became discretely less likely to receive government appointments and contracts upon his purge. Effects on appointments are greatest for high-spending agencies, and firms affiliated with the military and with Nicolas Maduro gained access to government contracts. Downstream agents seem to share the fortunes of their patrons after coalition-shaping policies induced by worsening economic conditions.
Abstract: This paper introduces the Urban Inequality Dataset, a harmonized panel of intra-urban economic disparity measures for 12,315 cities between 1995 to 2020. The dataset integrates satellite-derived nighttime lights (NTL) from the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program Operational Linescan System (DMSP-OLS) and the Visible Infrared Imaging Radiometer Suite (VIIRS) with gridded population estimates from the Gridded Population of the World (GPWv3 and GPWv4) to construct city-level inequality indicators. Urban extents are defined using the Global Human Settlement Layer Urban Centre Database (GHS-UCDB R2019A), which applies functional rather than administrative city boundaries. For each city and available year, we provide three complementary metrics: Gini coefficients, Theil indices, and center-periphery luminosity gradients, the latter estimated both with and without controls for local population density. These measures capture different dimensions of spatial inequality and enable systematic global comparisons of how economic activity is distributed within urban areas.
Abstract: Economic sanctions are usually evaluated as external shocks that reduce income in target countries. This paper argues that their net welfare consequences depend on the sanction-proofing strategies chosen by sanctioned governments. In autocracies, sanctions may disrupt the political-economy equilibrium through which incumbents extract from citizens and compensate insiders. I develop a model in which an autocrat chooses domestic extraction and elite transfers under the threat of protests and elite coups. Within an elite-buyoff regime, sanctions may induce predatory extraction or limited compensation, but cannot make citizens better off than before sanctions. Welfare-enhancing sanction-proofing requires a discrete strategy switch: once sanctions make insider compensation too costly, the regime may reduce extraction sharply in order to lower protest and coup risk. I study this mechanism in Venezuela after the 2019 U.S. oil sanctions. The Maduro government dismantled foreign exchange controls, tolerated de facto dollarization, and relaxed price controls in a policy turn described as a way to withstand sanctions. Using transaction-level Venezuelan and Colombian import data, I estimate yearly overpricing by comparing purchases of the same product from the same origin country. Overpricing rose during the control regime, peaked before the 2017 financial sanctions, and fell to zero after the 2019 oil embargo. Difference-in-differences estimates show an immediate 40–49 log-point decline in the Venezuelan import price premium after the embargo. The evidence suggests that sanctions helped eliminate a major channel of insider rent extraction. In this case, liberalization was plausibly a welfare-enhancing sanction-proofing strategy.
Abstract: This paper examines whether International Criminal Court (ICC) actions deter state violence in authoritarian settings. We study Venezuela under Nicolás Maduro following two ICC interventions: the 2018 multistate referral requesting an investigation, and the 2020 prosecutorial determination that crimes against humanity had likely been committed. Using a regression discontinuity design on state-perpetrated killings data (2016–2024), we find that the 2018 referral—an external threat of future prosecution—corresponded with a significant reduction in killings by nationally commanded security forces. However, no comparable pattern emerges after the 2020 determination. We interpret this divergence through an ``avoidability’’ mechanism: ICC deterrence operates when prosecution remains avoidable, but dissipates once incumbents conclude that avoiding accountability requires maintaining power rather than moderating repression.
Abstract: We develop a theory of election-day information asymmetries in competitive authoritarian settings, and use it to analyze Venezuela’s 2024 presidential election. We argue that when autocratic regimes observe election results before the opposition, defeated incumbents may exploit the resulting window of uncertainty to “move to a Plan B”, delaying publication, manufacturing narratives, and falsifying the results. The model shows that asymmetric information increases the expected payoff from post-election fraud by inducing opposition timidity, and can therefore make holding risky elections more attractive ex ante. Empirically, we reconstruct election-night information streams using machine-printed timestamps and opposition scan times from precinct-level tally sheets. We show that Maduro’s defeat was statistically and arithmetically irreversible from his perspective in less than two hours after polls closed. However, the opposition lacked comparable certainty on election night. Based on these findings, our model seamlessly explains both parties’ key decisions and statements.
Abstract: This study provides evidence favoring the “industrial matching” hypothesis that refugees sort between areas with similar industries where home-grown skills are transferable. We evaluate flows between Venezuelan and Colombian localities in the context of Venezuela’s refugee shock. We perform Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood (PPML) gravity models to evaluate whether bilateral similarities in baseline industrial structure explain refugee flows after controlling for key potential confounders. Venezuelan refugees tend to move towards Colombian localities with similar baseline industries relative to their origin localities. Heterogeneity analyses highlight agriculture as a particularly relevant sector behind our results. Despite limited agency, refugees may sort towards economic opportunities consistent with their background - a relevant finding for policymakers concerned about the economic integration of the refugees they host.
Abstract: Did large-scale migration foster local economic resilience along border transit routes after Venezuela’s 2017 refugee shock? Combining monthly municipal nighttime lights and outmigration data with three measures of exposure to border transit, we estimate difference-in-differences and event-study models for 2016–2020. Border transit municipalities display low initial resistance: luminosity fell and outmigration rose as low-migration-cost residents left first. Both patterns reversed in late 2018, suggesting adaptive re-orientation: as interior migrants concentrated along the corridor, demand for transportation, commerce, and services sustained local activity and attenuated residents’ outmigration. Border transit areas benefited from reorganizing around the demand the crisis itself generated.
Abstract: Starting in 2013, Venezuela experienced one of the largest economic collapses and refugee crises in modern history, with more than eight million people (over 25% of the population) emigrating. A prominent literature argues that U.S. sanctions, first imposed in 2017, caused these outcomes by eroding oil production and export revenues. If sanctions induced the economic collapse by disrupting the oil sector, oil-producing municipalities should have experienced disproportionate economic deterioration and outmigration. We test this hypothesis using a difference-in-differences design that exploits the geographic concentration of oil production across Venezuelan municipalities. Combining municipality-level panel data on nighttime lights, staple food sales, migration to Colombia and electoral turnout, we find no evidence that oil-producing municipalities experienced sharper economic declines or higher migration rates upon sanctions. These findings challenge the view that sanctions were a primary driver of Venezuela’s economic and refugee crisis.
Abstract: Understanding the primary causes of human prosperity is one of the most important endeavors of social scientists. Much research in the 20th century followed a neo-classical approach which emphasized important factors such as physical capital, human capital, and technological change, but was nonetheless devoid of historical context and political factors. In recent decades there has been a resurgence of political and historically-embedded explanations of economic development, which have greatly expanded upon the works of early political economists such as Adam Smith, John Stuart Mill, and Karl Marx. This chapter provides an overview of this recent research on geography, institutions, and human capital, along with their interactions, as drivers of long-term economic development. We then move beyond these paradigms to argue that explanations focused on state capacity and state-led development have been largely overlooked by many historical political economists. A better understanding of the state should help scholars identify paths to break away from the low-growth equilibrium of less-developed countries. (Preprint)
Abstract: As the COVID-19 pandemic pushed firms to comply with social distancing guidelines, the relative demand for work that could be performed from home was expected to increase. However, while employment in “remotable" occupations was relatively resilient during the pandemic, online job postings, which measure demand for new hires, for these occupations dropped disproportionately. This apparent contradiction is not explained by prior job “churning" in “non-remote” jobs, nor by the recomposition of the labor market across economic sectors. The underperformance of postings for “remotable” jobs during the pandemic is concentrated in essential occupations and occupations with high returns to experience. (Preprint)
Tecnológico de Monterrey - Mexico City, Mexico - Spring, 2026
Harvard Kennedy School Teaching Case Study - January, 2026
Tecnológico de Monterrey - Mexico City, Mexico - Winter, 2025
Tecnológico de Monterrey - Mexico City, Mexico - Spring, 2024 - 2026
Texas A&M University - College Station, TX - Spring, 2024
Texas A&M University - College Station, TX - Spring, 2024
Texas A&M University - College Station, TX - Fall, 2023
Universidad Católica Andrés Bello - Caracas, Venezuela - Spring, 2022
Harvard University - Cambridge, MA - Spring, 2020
Harvard University - Cambridge, MA - Fall, 2019
Harvard University - Cambridge, MA - Fall, 2018
Harvard Business School Teaching Case Study - April, 2018
Universidad Católica Andrés Bello - Caracas, Venezuela - Fall, 2012
Escuela de Gobierno y Transformación Pública, Tec de Monterrey - July 2026
Escuela de Gobierno y Transformación Pública, Tec de Monterrey - June 2024
Mosbacher Institute, Texas A&M University - May 2024
Center for Global Development - December 2022 (Versión en Español)
The Brookings Institution - August 2021
The Brookings Institution - May 2019
The Brookings Institution - May 2019
The Brookings Institution - May 2019
Prodavinci and Medium - May 2019 (Versión en Español)
CID Working Papers, Harvard University - October, 2018
CID Working Papers, Harvard University - September 2018
CID Working Papers, Harvard University - September 2018
CID Working Papers, Harvard University - September 2018
Prodavinci - January, 2018
CID Working Papers, Harvard University - October, 2016
CID Working Papers, Harvard University - October, 2016
CID Working Papers, Harvard University - June, 2016
CGD Working Papers, Harvard University - September, 2012
Harvard Kennedy School - May, 2012 (Policy Brief)
Interview on Sanctions and Political Negotiations in Venezuela:
Union Radio (July, 2026)
Interview on Venezuela’s Double Earthquake:
CNN En Español’s Oppenheimer Presenta (Min 23:15) (July, 2026)
Interview on Venezuela’s Double Earthquake:
Esto es Venezueling Podcast (July, 2026)
Interview on book about sanctions on Venezuela:
Tres Preguntas Podcast (July, 2026)
Interview on book about sanctions on Venezuela:
UPenn’s Ceteris Paribus Podcast (July, 2026)
Interview on book about sanctions on Venezuela:
Runrunes/TalCual/ElPitazo (Min 13:30) (May, 2026)
Interview on book about sanctions on Venezuela:
VPI TV (May, 2026)
Interview on book about sanctions on Venezuela:
Caracas Chronicles (May, 2026)
Interview on JoD article on democracy and transitional justice in Venezuela:
Review of Democracy (April, 2026)
Podcast Interview on Venezuela after the extraction of Nicolás Maduro:
La Plaza de Toro (January, 2026)
Interview on Venezuela after the extraction of Nicolás Maduro:
France24 (January, 2026)
Interview on implications of the extraction of Nicolás Maduro for Mexico:
El Universal (January, 2026)
Interview with Andrés Oppenheimer on exit options for Nicolás Maduro in Venezuela:
Miami Herald | El Nuevo Herald | Diario Reforma | Confidencial Nicaragua | Estadão (November, 2025)
Podcast Interview on climate matching in refugee settlement choices:
The Policy Lab (October, 2025)
Interview on Venezuelan 2024 election results:
France24 (August, 2024)
Interview on the effect of the Mexican Drug War on local exports:
Faculti (October, 2023)
Interviewing Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Alastair Smith about Political Favoritism and Regime Stability (November, 2022)
Interviewing Chris Blattman about his book “Why we Fight” (July, 2022)
Harvard’s ReVista (April, 2020)
Interamerican Dialogue’s Energy Advisor (October, 2016)